Saturday, December 02, 2006

From Keith Augustine: Does Consciousness Depend on the Brain?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on December 2, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Chris Carter has recently posted an article challenging the idea that consciousness depends (for its very existence) on the brain. I've read it carefully and am underwhelmed. I have two general comments.

First, though Carter summarizes the evidence for mind-brain dependence well in the beginning, he has merely asserted--and comes nowhere near demonstrating--that William James' "transmissive hypothesis" (a variant of what Paul Edwards' called "the instrument theory," the notion that the brain is merely an instrument of the soul) is "Just as consistent with the observed facts..." Saying so is one thing. Showing it is another. Nothing in this paper does the latter.

Second, it is simply false to characterize the explanatory value of materialism and dualism, with regard to the overwhelming evidence for mind-brain dependence, as on a par. Materialism clearly explains such evidence better in demonstrable ways.

Indeed, over 80 years ago, philosopher C. D. Broad's intellectual honesty compelled him to concede as much. In a chapter titled "Empirical Arguments for Human Survival" in his 1925 classic on the philosophy of mind, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, before defending his own idiosyncratic form of dualism he dubbed "compound theory," Broad writes:

"The view that the mind is existentially dependent on the organism and on nothing else is compatible with all the normal facts, and is positively suggested by them, though they do not necessitate it. And it is the simplest possible view to take. The theory that the mind merely uses the body as an instrument is difficult to reconcile with the normal facts; and it is doubtful whether there are any well-established [paranormal] phenomena that require it."

Carter fails to address any arguments to the effect that materialism (broadly conceived to include property dualism) explains the evidence for mind-brain dependence much better than any form of substance dualism--arguments even present in his main target: Corliss Lamont's The Illusion of Immortality. For instance, Carter writes:

"James then explores the various possibilities for the exact type of functional dependence between the brain and consciousness. It is normally thought of as productive, in the sense that steam is produced as a function of the kettle. But this is not the only form of function that we find in nature: we also have at least two other forms of functional dependence: the permissive function, as found in the trigger of a crossbow; and the transmissive function, as of a lens or a prism. The lens or prism do not produce the light but merely transmit it in a different form. As James writes

Similarly, the keys of an organ have only a transmissive function. They open successively the various pipes and let the wind in the air-chest escape in various ways. The voices of the various pipes are constituted by the columns of air trembling as they emerge. But the air is not engendered in the organ. The organ proper, as distinguished from its air-chest, is only an apparatus for letting portions of it loose upon the world in these peculiarly limited shapes."

In The Illusion of Immortality, Corliss Lamont directly rebutted the prism analogy, which could easily be modified to cover the organ analogy as well:

"If the human body corresponds to a colored glass ... then the living personality corresponds to the colored light that is the result of the glass.... Now while light in general will continue to exist without the colored glass ... the specific red or blue or yellow rays that the glass produces ... will certainly not persist if the glass [is] destroyed" (p. 104).

Yet Carter does not say a word in reply. And what about the simple point Paul Churchland raises in the introduction to his 1984 Matter and Consciousness:

"If there really is a distinct entity [an immaterial soul] in which reasoning, emotion, and consciousness take place, and if that entity is dependent on the brain for nothing more than sensory experiences as input and volitional executions as output [the transmissive hypothesis], then one would expect reason, emotion, and consciousness to be relatively invulnerable to direct control or pathology by manipulation or damage to the brain. But in fact the exact opposite is true. Alcohol, narcotics, or senile degeneration of nerve tissue will impair, cripple, or even destroy one's capacity for rational thought.... And the vulnerability of consciousness to anesthetics, to caffeine, and to something as simple as a sharp blow to the head, shows its very close dependence on neural activity in the brain. All of this makes perfect sense if reason, emotion, and consciousness are activities of the brain itself. But it makes very little sense if they are activities of something else entirely" (p. 20).

Carter goes on to say that all that the mind-brain dependence evidence shows is concomitant variation, not that mental activity is produced by the brain. But, as Hume has argued, if the issue is one of probability, this is precisely what concomitant variation implies: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death." Indeed, John Stuart Mill even recommended the "method of concomitant variation" as one of the most reliable ways to reason from effect to cause, that is, to infer the most probable common cause of a number of effects.
Let's look at Hume's example. As brain complexity increases, mental abilities also increase (in Hume's example, when you chart brain growth from infancy to adulthood; but also when differences in the intelligence of species with brains of varying complexity are compared). At the same time, as brain complexity decreases--in the progressive stages of Alzheimer's disease (Hume's "gradual decay"), say, or by progressively destroying more and more of the brain--mental acuity also decreases.

Mill's method of concomitant variation recommends that we look for a prior condition that correspondingly varies with all events of certain type in order to identify that condition as a potential cause of events of that type. In this case, the question becomes: What always varies with the varying mental capacities of (say) different organisms? The answer: The complexity of their brains. As brain complexity goes up, mental abilities increase. As brain complexity goes down, mental abilities decrease. Brain complexity, then, causes mental ability. In short, the brain causes (or "produces") the mind. If the William James' transmissive hypothesis were correct, and the brain essentially only acted as a "transceiver" for consciousness, there is no reason to think that ever increasing mental complexity would require, in step, ever increasing brain complexity. A chimpanzee or a human being can type on a typewriter, but the greater complexity of what the human being types doesn't require any increase in the complexity of their "instrument"--the typewriter. But increasing mental acuity does appear, without exception, to require increasing brain complexity. That observation is precisely the opposite of what one would predict if substance dualism were true, and exactly what we would expect if consciousness was a property of the brain.

Despite the clarity of this point, Carter concludes: "[T]he dependence of consciousness on the brain for the manner of its manifestation in the material world does not imply that consciousness depends upon the brain for its existence" [emphasis mine].

It seems to me that there is an intentional ambiguity here: what does Carter mean by 'the manifestation of consciousness'? The most natural interpretation of 'consciousness manifesting itself in the physical world' is the behavior of conscious beings. But, as Corliss Lamont argued: "A severe injury to the head ... may change an ordinarily cheerful man into a sullen and morose one subject to sudden fits of homicidal mania. If the brain and body are simply the instruments of the soul, we have to say in such a case that this personality is really still brimming over with joy and benevolence, but that unfortunately these sentiments can only express ["manifest"] themselves in dark glances, in peevish complaints and in violent attacks" (p. 100).

Evidently, then, 'the manifestation of consciousness' cannot refer to behavior, because it is demonstrable that manipulating the brain does not merely modify behavior, leaving the mind itself intact, but modifies mental functioning itself. LSD affects how you think, not merely how you behave. So what can Carter possibly mean by 'the manifestation of consciousness'?

Link: Number of Atheists Worldwide

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]


ReligionFacts.com has a chart on their site, "The Big Religion Chart," summarizing the major "religions / sects / groups / philosophies / belief systems." Atheism is included in the chart and is listed as having 1.1 billion adherents worldwide. I'm virtually certain that this number is wildly overstated. The only way they can come up with a number that big is to include everyone who says they are "nonreligious." The problem with that approach, of course, is that a person can be "nonreligious" and believe in God.

LINK (HT to Jim Lippard)

Can a Theist be a Freethinker?

The following link goes to a featured editorial I wrote several years ago for the Secular Web. I argue that (1) a theist can be a freethinker, and (2) not all nontheists are freethinker.

LINK

Sunday, November 26, 2006

Link: New Article on Relationship between Degree of Religious Belief and Societal Health

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 26, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

I've only skimmed this article, but I'm linking to it for others who might be interested. (Thanks to Charles Echelbarger for tipping me off to this.)

LINK

The Evidential Argument from Mind-Brain Dependence: A Reply to Bilbo

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 26, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

In my response to Victor Reppert's anti-naturalistic argument from pain, I stated that a more specific fact (consciousness is dependent upon the physical brain) about consciousness is antecedently more likely on naturalism than on theism. Bilbo provided several feedback messages in response to this claim. As I read him, he thinks the argument is no threat to Christian theists. It is apparently his view that mind-brain dependence is at least as probable on Christian theism as on naturalism, since Christian theists believe in specific, sectarian doctrines that raise the probability of mind-brain dependence. Since I think Bilbo is wrong about this, I'll explain why.

First, here is the logical form of my evidential argument.

Let D = the mind is dependent upon the physical brain.
Let T = classical theism
Let N = metaphysical naturalism

(1) D is known to be true.
(2) T is not much more probable intrinsically than N.
(3) Pr(D/N) > Pr(D/T).
(4) Other evidence held equal, T is probably false.

Note the modest nature of this argument. It doesn't claim that theism is probably false; it merely claims that evidence (D), by itself, favors N over T. This distinction is crucial since it allows for the possibility that there could be other evidence that both favors T and outweighs the evidence for N provided by D. Thus, D should be understood as a prime facie reason for rejecting T.

Let me now turn to some of Bilbo's specific comments.

Bilbo: "My first problem is that it seems more accurate to say that minds *are* the physical brain on Naturalism (not merely dependent on them). And since this has not been demonstrated, it would beg the question to assert that the postulate that "minds are the physical brain" provides evidence for Naturalism."

That would indeed beg the question, which is why I never said that! My argument is an inductive argument. It would be illegitimate to state the evidence in such a way that entails the hypothesis to be proved. Therefore, I'll stick with my original formulation of the premise ("the mind is dependent upon the physical brain").

Bilbo: "But the Christian views I mentioned also make it antecedently probable that minds will be dependent on the brain. Let's use the structure of your argument with Christian non-reductive physicalism (hereafter NRP)..."

If theism is improbable given D, then so is Christian theism (or any other more specific belief system that entails theism). Christian theism entails theism; therefore it cannot be more probable than theism. Premise (4) entails that, other evidence held equal, Christian theism is probably false.

I don't deny the potential relevance of sectarian doctrines to the issue of whether my argument is sound. They could raise Pr(D/T) or lower Pr(D/N). In order to assess the evidential significance of such doctrines, we would need to apply a principle that Draper calls the "weighted average principle" (WAP). Let H represent some Christian doctrine. Then WAP can be represented as follows.

Pr(D/T) = Pr(H/T) x Pr(D/T&H;) + Pr(~H/T) x Pr(D/T&~H)

This formula is an average because Pr(H/T) + Pr(~H/T) = 1. It is not a simple straight average, however, since those two values may not equal 1/2.

Let us consider, then, Christian non-reductive physicalism (CNRP), which Bilbo proposes as a specific doctrine that he believes raises the probability of D given (Christian) theism. Bilbo defines CNRP as "the non-existence of all supernatural beings, except for those that are or were at some point divine (angels, demons, God, etc.)." Bilbo claims that CNRP "entails the nonexistence of disembodied human minds." Using WAP, we obtain the following.

Pr(D/T) = Pr(CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&CNRP;) + Pr(~CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&~CNRP)

In order to reject my evidential argument, therefore, Bilbo would need to show that CNRP raises Pr(D/T) so that it is greater than or equal to Pr(D/N) by using the above formula. Does CNRP do that? I shall leave the question as an exercise for the reader.

(Note: I have borrowed heavily from ideas in another paper by Paul Draper, "More Pain and Pleasure: A Reply to Otte." I am, of course, responsible for any errors in my post.)

Saturday, November 25, 2006

Victor Reppert's Anti-Naturalistic Argument from Pain

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006 and then republished on February 11, 2016. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

There are a variety of approaches to formulating an argument from evil against theism. Two of the most influential versions of the evidential argument from evil were developed by atheist William Rowe and agnostic Paul Draper. Both involve appeals to pain. In a recent entry on his blog, Victor Reppert tries to turn the tables on proponents of arguments from evil (pain) by arguing that pain is a problem for atheists. Reppert formulates his argument against naturalism as follows.

1. If naturalism is true, then consciousness does not emerge.
2. If consciousness does not emerge, then pain does not exist.
3. Therefore, if naturalism is true, then pain does not exist.
4. Pain exists.
5. Therefore, naturalism is false.

Notice that premise (1) of the above argument entails that naturalism and consciousness are logically incompatible. Reppert's argument may be reasonably characterized, then, as a very specific example of a logical argument from consciousness against naturalism (as opposed to an evidential argument from consciousness as defended by Richard Swinburne). I believe this characterization is further supported by Reppert's statement, "the actual internally experienced state of pain is a huge, hard problem for atheistic naturalism, a problem that I personally consider to be logically impossible to solve."

Does Reppert literally mean what he says? As a so-called logical argument against naturalism, it isn't clear to me why this argument is in any way an improvement over logical arguments from evil against theism. In particular, Reppert has not yet presented a defense of (1) in its current form (i.e., lacking some sort of probabilistic hedge).

Perhaps, however, Reppert did not intend for his argument to be worded so strongly. Instead, he might say, we should understand his argument as an evidential argument against naturalism. If so, it seems to me that Reppert's argument from pain violates the Rule of Total Evidence. Allow me to explain. Let us assume, for the sake of argument that Reppert is correct that consciousness is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism. Furthermore, as Reppert points out, pain presupposes consciousness. It doesn't follow from these two assumptions, however, that the statement, "The kinds and distribution of pain we find in the world is epistemically more probable on naturalism than on theism," is false.

Here's why. Reppert has committed the fallacy of understated evidence. In general terms, we could say that Reppert has identified some general fact F (consciousness exists) about a topic X (consciousness) that is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism. It could still be the case that a more specific fact (S) about X is antecedently more likely on naturalism than on theism. As Paul Draper writes, "we know a lot more about phenomenal consciousness than just that it exists" ("Partisanship and Inquiry in the Philosophy of Religion," unpublished paper). Draper then gives an example of a more specific fact about consciousness, a fact that, given consciousness exists, is more probable on naturalism than on theism. As Draper explains, we also know from neuroscience that the mind is dependent upon the physical brain, a fact that is more likely on naturalism and consciousness than on theism and consciousness. Thus, as Draper concludes, "when the available evidence about consciousness is fully stated, it is far from clear that it significantly favors theism."

John Stewart and Richard Dawkins on Ted Haggard

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. Unfortunately, the link has mysteriously disappeared from Patheos and I wasn't able to quickly find it when searching on YouTube.]

 

Here is the description of the video as provided at YouTube:

"Jon Stewart analyzes the latest gay surprise as the evangelical, gay-bashing preacher, Pastor Ted, gets caught with his three-year gay lover and supplier of crystal meth. What else is new? For an added bit of spice, there is an earlier clip of Haggard lecturing Richard Dawkins on arrogance. Just too beautiful."

While Haggard's behavior (buying crystal meth and a "massage" from a gay prostitute) are clearly hugely embarrassing to evangelical Christians, what is not so clear is whether anything of philosophical significance follows from his behavior. For example, I've heard many people refer to Haggard as a "hypocrite," but the fact is that Haggard never tried to marry a man and he never claimed that homosexuality is morally acceptable. On the contrary, Haggard made it very clear that he considered his behavior morally wrong -- and he seemed pretty sincere to me when condemned himself. I conclude that Haggard sincerely believes homosexuality is wrong, but he obviously has some sort of internal struggle with his sexual orientation that prevents him from consistently behaving in accordance with that belief.

What I find much more interesting is the portion of video where Dawkins gets into a somewhat heated exchange with Haggard over science. Haggard actually has the audacity to lecture Dawkins on "intellectual arrogance." Why? Because Dawkins pointed out the absurdity of Haggard's claim that evolution is the view that things like eyes and ears came about by "accident." As Dawkins correctly points out, no evolutionary biologist believes such a thing. That Haggard would make such a statement reveals his utter ignorance of contemporary science. It's okay if evangelicals like Haggard want to reject evolution (and even urge others to do so), but the least they can do is to actually reject evolution and not some Sunday school strawman version of it.

New Blog: the Ex-Apologist

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

LINK

This blog is described as being "Dedicated to fair exposition and critique of Christianity and Christian apologetics." The anonymous author provides the following profile: "I'm currently in the late stages of a PhD program in Philosophy. I was a Christian and an "apologetics nerd" for 15 years, but deconverted at the end of 2005. " Topics of previous posts include the fine-tuning argument, empirical case for the accuracy of the New Testament, Divine Command Theories, Free Will Defense, kalam cosmological argument, and more!

Link: Witmer-Cook Debate on Presuppositionalism

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

I recently mentioned Gene Witmer's critique of presuppositionalism in an earlier post. Presuppositional apologist Gene Cook has also taken notice of Witmer's critique. The two discussed the issues on Cook's podcast

Sunday, November 12, 2006

Link: Time Magazine: God vs. Science

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

LINK

Interesting Article on Debating Presuppositionalists

Gene Witmer is a philosopher at the University of Florida who has recently written a paper critiquing presuppositionalism. It appears that the paper is not a formal paper intended for publication in its current form, but rather is a preprint prepared for a "talk" to the Atheist, Agnostic and Freethinking Student Association at the University of Florida.

Saturday, November 04, 2006

Richard Carrier Launches Blog

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. I have also updated the link to the blog's current address.] 

LINK

Links: Two Articles about Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Atheists top book charts by deconstructing God

The Church of the Non-Believers 

Link: Haggard Scandal Is Latest Setback In Tough Year For Religious Right, Says Americans United

 LINK

Links: Hovind Going to Jail For a Long Time

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

'Dr. Dino' guilty on all counts: Couple could get more than 200 years

Hard to believe a man with a Ph.D didn't know of a basic tax law

(Hat tip to Doug Krueger.)

Saturday, September 16, 2006

Theism vs. Naturalism Debates: An Apples to Oranges Comparison?

I received an email from a nontheist that is somewhat critical of the idea of "naturalism vs. theism" as a debate topic because (1) not all non-naturalistic views are theistic, and (2) the topic involves a comparison of a general hypothesis (metaphysical naturalism) with an incompatible but very specific hypothesis (theism). In his opinion, the debate topic should be either "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "nontheism (or atheism) vs. theism."

Monday, September 04, 2006

Link: Video of Lowder-Fernandes Debate

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on September 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

See here.

Tuesday, July 04, 2006

Who is the Most Prominent Atheist?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on July 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Philosopher Doug Krueger once made the interesting observation that whenever theists want to boast about their alleged successes in debates with atheists, theists always describe their opponents as "best-known," "foremost," the "most famous," or the "most prominent." For example:

If I were to generalize a bit, it appears there is interest in answering the following questions:

  • For any purported atheist, is the individual recognized as an atheist by other atheists?
  • Who is the most prominent atheist philosopher (living or deceased)?
  • Who is the most prominent living atheist philosopher?
  • Who is the "best" atheist debater?
  • Who has the strongest arguments for atheism?
  • Which atheist has the best rebuttals to theistic arguments?
  • For any given atheist, are their arguments for atheism representative of what you consider to be the best arguments for atheism?

This got me thinking about an idea. Anyone who is a sports fan is familiar with various polls that rank teams and players in different sports, such as ESPN's NFL Power Rankings, the National Football League's Pro Bowl, the AP College Football Poll, the Major League Baseball All-Star Game, and so forth. You get the idea. It would be interesting (and potentially useful) if atheist philosophers, debaters, and activists were to do their own poll or ranking of fellow atheists, similar to the polls and rankings we see in the sports world. (This could be potentially useful to both sides, insofar as it might help address a situation where Christian debaters select a particular atheist as their debate opponent, claim that the atheist is a better spokesperson for atheism than he or she is, and then other atheists are disappointed in the selection of the atheist spokesperson.) Of course, this idea raises all sorts of logistical questions, such as what exactly would be voted on, who gets to vote, when would the vote occur (i.e., how often), how will the votes be counted, and so forth. But if this idea were perceived as useful, I'm sure that these issues could be figured out.

What do you think? Would the idea of "ranking" atheist philosophers, debaters, or activists be useful?

Gary Habermas's Critique of G.A. Wells

In 1985, Antony Flew debated Gary Habermas on the resurrection of Jesus; that debate was later published as a book in 1987. G.A. Wells felt that Flew did so poorly in the debate, on a topic outside of Flew's area of expertise, that Wells felt compelled to write a commentary on the debate on the Habermas-Flew debate. I have just discovered that Habermas has, in turn, written a response to Wells's case for the nonexistence of Jesus, which includes a very brief reference to Wells's commentary on the Habermas-Flew debate.

Monday, May 01, 2006

Links: Hostility to Atheists

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on May 1, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Ilya Somin is a law professor at George Mason University who recently wrote several blog entries on prejudice against atheists, especially in the law:

Somin later massaged these posts into a more formal article, "The Final Prejudice," that was published in The Legal Times, but that article is not available online.

Thanks to Eddie Tabash for making me aware of Somin's Legal Times article.

Update: I just read all of the comments on the "Still More..." link. It is amazing, if not depressing, to read such brazen anti-atheist bigotry from some of the respondents.

Link: Atheism with a Smile

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on May 1, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

In light of Rabbi Gellman's recent editorial about "angry atheists," here's a piece of good news. The LA Times recently reported on a high-profile counter-example: Julia Sweeney, a "smiling atheist."

(Thanks to Eddie Tabash for pointing out this article to me.)

For more information, see Julia's blog.

Link: Sunday Mail Service in a Christian Nation

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on May 1, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Here is an interesting article on the Founding Fathers' intent for the separation of church and state, focusing on the practices of the Post Office:

http://atheism.about.com/b/a/242048.htm/

I'd never seen some of these points before. Thanks to Bill Schultz for pointing this out to me.

Link: The Shrinking Secular Family

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on May 1, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

World Magazine recently blogged about the "shrinking liberal family." Although I usually disagree with the viewpoint expressed by that magazine, this is one issue where I find myself in agreement with them. In fact, it is something I have been saying for years. I don't claim to have hard statistical evidence, but it has always been my experience that, on average, religious families tend to have more children than non-religious families. Moreover, on average, the largest families are almost always religious whereas couples with no children are more likely to be non-religious.

I'd be interested in hearing from others about whether their observations match mine. 

Sunday, April 30, 2006

Recent Discussion about THE EMPTY TOMB: JESUS BEYOND THE GRAVE

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on April 30, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Here are some links to recent discussion about our book, The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave (Buffalo, New York: Prometheus, 2005):

Daniel Howard-Snyder's Critique of the Trilemma Argument

Christian philosopher Daniel Howard-Snyder has published a critique of the trilemma argument. LINK (PDF)

Are Atheists Angry or Threatened by God?

I just posted an article on this topic at the Secular Outpost. LINK

Link: Mark Vuletic's Blog

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on April 30, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Philosopher of religion Mark Vuletic now has his own blog.

Saturday, April 29, 2006

Are Atheists Angry or Threatened by God?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on April 29, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

I recently read a web-exclusive commentary on Newsweek magazine's website by Rabbi Marc Gellman entitled, "Trying to Understand Angry Atheists." The article's sub-title asked the question, "Why do nonbelievers seem to be threatened by the idea of God?" Gellman begins his article with the following words:

I think I need to understand atheists better. I bear them no ill will. I don't think they need to be religious to be good, kind and charitable people, and I have no desire to debate or convert them.

I think these are perfectly reasonable statements and the world would almost certainly be a better place if everyone demonstrated the kind of humility shown by Gellman in his commentary's introduction. Before we go any further, then, allow me to return the favor: I need to understand theists better. I bear them no ill will. I don't think they need to be secular to be rational, intelligent, and well-informed about science. I don't desire to convert theists to atheism, but I do admit that I desire to stop prejudice against atheists.

Returning to Gellman's article, I soon found Gellman making a different type of statement about atheists. He writes:

However, there is something I am missing about atheists: what I simply do not understand is why they are often so angry.

How should atheists respond to Gellman's perplexity?

As an atheist myself, I have to confess it is tempting to get on the defensive. If I were to go down that path, I would probably focus on disproving the assumption that atheists "are often so angry" because I do not consider myself angry even though I am an atheist, and the majority of atheists I know are also not angry. Some atheists are angry, however. In response to Gellman's editorial, those atheists admit they are angry and try to justify it. (See, for example, three of the letters to Newsweek magazine posted on American Atheist's website under a special "Action Alert" about Gellman's article.)

I wonder, however, if defensive strategies are a mistake. Rabbi Gellman said earlier that he bears atheists no ill will, and I take him at his word. Again, he said that he thinks he needs to understand atheists better, so why not take that statement at face value as a genuine request for enlightenment? Moreover, as several atheists themselves have noted, Gellman is by no means the first person to express the belief that atheists are angry. In other words, there is a perception that atheists are angry, and that would still be the case even if the perception were inaccurate at best or a hurtful stereotype at worst.

While I cannot tell other atheists how they should respond to Gellman's perplexity, my own response begins with acknowledgment. Because Gellman's editorial presupposes, not argues, that atheists "are often so angry," I don't know what specific experiences or observations led to his statement. It is not difficult to believe, however, that his only or dominant experience of atheists has been exposure to angry atheists. I can think of at least three reasons why. (There are probably others.)

First, probably the most famous atheist in the United States is the late Madalyn Murray O'Hair, despite the fact that she has now been dead for ten years. O'Hair, who was often called "the most hated woman in America," was surely an angry atheist if there ever were one. Not only was she rude to theists, she was rude to agnostics and even fellow atheists as well. (In fairness to O'Hair, who can no longer defend herself, it must be acknowledged that she suffered horrible emotional injuries for her courage to stand up for what she thought was right. She was the constant recipient of death threats and other forms of harassment, and decades of exposure to such behavior surely took their toll on O'Hair. Nevertheless, she was an adult and fully responsible for her uncivil behavior.) And the failure of many atheist organizations--most notably, American Atheists--to loudly and publicly condemn her behavior has certainly not helped the public's perceptions of atheists.

Second, much of the media coverage of atheists is related to highly controversial church-state issues, issues that are often viewed as petty by non-atheists. Think about it. How often do you see the word "atheist" in a newspaper story that is not related to a church-state issue? And what about the significance of the specific issues raised in atheist-specific lawsuits? Recent atheist-driven lawsuits have focused on the presence of the word "God" in the Pledge of Allegiance and on currency. If I were a theist and did not know any atheists, I can easily imagine myself drawing the same conclusion that Gellman and many other people have drawn, namely, the idea that "nonbelievers seem to be threatened by the idea of God."

Third, I have watched several self-appointed defenders of atheism exhibit uncivil behavior in public debates on God's existence. While I believe such behavior in public debates is the exception rather than the rule, the fact that it happens at all must have a negative impact on the public's perception of atheists.

Even though I think there is evidence that many atheists are not angry (and also that some theists are angry), there is clearly evidence that some high-profile atheists are angry atheists. What to do?

Many atheists have compared the difficulty of leading atheists to the difficulty of herding cats. There is a lot of wisdom in that view. Atheism has no "pope" and I, at least, do not claim to be the leader of the atheist movement. It's not like atheism is a corporation where the bad employees can be fired. Nevertheless, I can think of at least one idea that will help with the situation: accountability. Rather than ask theists to trust us (atheists), I invite them to track us. Hold us accountable. Measure our performance. If a high-profile atheist publicly exhibits unjustified anger or lack of civility, watch and see if any major atheist organizations criticize that atheist. If they don't, then criticize not only the high-profile atheist, but all of the organizations that failed to condemn the behavior. On the flip side, however, if a high-profile atheist does not exhibit anger and does not seem "threatened by the idea of God," then give them credit.

Soon after its inception in 1995, the Internet Infidels instituted a peer review process for all papers submitted for publication in the Secular Web's Modern Library. Although the primary purpose of the peer review process was to ensure the accuracy and quality of the papers selected for publication, a secondary purpose of the peer review process was to ensure that all papers published in the Modern Library were professional. The peer review process was far from perfect and over the years several improvements have been made. Even so, the process has had some successes, including at least one that is relevant to the topic of angry atheists. A high-profile atheist had submitted a paper that definitely came across as angry. I required that it be revised before publication, which it was. Likewise, I am aware of angry atheists engaging in unacceptable behavior on the Internet Infidels Discussion Board, which resulted in their banning from the forum. This should be some consolation to those, like Rabbi Gellman, who are tempted to question why some atheists "are often so angry" or whether the angry atheists are representative of atheists in general.

Saturday, March 18, 2006

The Anthropic Principle

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on March 18, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Thanks to Don Morgan for forwarding this to me:

"The 'anthropic principle' states that the laws of nature were fine-tuned by the Great Designer to allow the existence of beings so intelligent that they could discover the anthropic principle. This is so incredibly deep that something happens to scientists who dwell on it too long."

- WHAT'S NEW, Robert L. Park; Friday, 17 Mar 06; Washington, DC

Is the U.S. Air Force a Christian Air Force?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on March 18, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

There are obviously many non-Christians who have served or are currently serving in the U.S. Air Force (USAF), but there is growing evidence that the USAF is, despite claims to the contrary, institutionally Christian. According to a recent article in USA Today, an Air Force recruiter has filed suit against the USAF because of consistent proselytizing by superior officers. (Thanks to Eddie Tabash for pointing this out to me.) The article states:

The 12-page court filing says guest speakers at conventions of Air Force recruiters in 2003 and 2005 told Burleigh and other recruiters that "they needed to accept Jesus Christ in order to perform their job duties" and "to use faith in Jesus Christ while recruiting."

When the plaintiff resisted his superiors' efforts at proselytizing, he became the target of lower performance ratings than peers who attended religious activities such as prayer groups and church.

I don't have much to say, except the obvious. If the allegations are true, then what the superior officers in the Air Force Recruiting Service are doing is not only conduct unbecoming a United States Airman, but illegal and indeed unconstitutional behavior. It would constitute an abuse of power by zealous Christian airmen trying to coerce a lower-ranking airman into becoming a Christian. (On a philosophical note, one wonders if the same individuals who are trying to coerce lower-ranking airmen into becoming Christians also use the "Free Will Defense" against arguments from evil for God's nonexistence, but I guess bullies don't have to be philosophically consistent.)

A Challenge to Christians

What I'd like to know is if any of the Christians who read this blog believe that such behavior is wrong and are willing to condemn it. I'm especially interested in whether the Christian bloggers who read this blog are willing to condemn the behavior on their own blogs.

A New Non-Profit Devoted to Military Religious Freedom

On a related subject, Jim Lippard just made me aware of a new non-profit organization devoted to military religious freedom: the Military Religious Freedom Foundation. They have a very polished website and also a brand new blog. The fact that non-Christians with ties to the U.S. Armed Forces even feel it necessary to create such a foundation is a sad commentary on the state of religious freedom within the U.S. Armed Forces. In any case, check out their organization.

Saturday, February 18, 2006

Sophisticated Critique of Many Worlds Explanation of Fine-Tuning

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 18, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. I have also updated the link to reflect the new location of the essay]

The following essay was recommended to me by Paul Draper. The paper is not a defense of the fine-tuning argument, but he regards it as one of the best critiques of the many worlds explanation of fine-tuning:

Roger White, "Fine-tuning and Multiple Universes," forthcoming in Nous
http://web.mit.edu/rog/www/papers/fine_tuning.pdf (PDF)

Here is some info about the author:

ROGER WHITE, (Ph.D., MIT), Assistant Professor of Philosophy, specializes in philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphysics. He is currently focusing on epistemological issues in the philosophy of science, particularly those having to do with probability and explanation. His main interests in metaphysics concern matters of identity and essential properties. He is the author of "Fine-tuning and Multiple Universes" (Nous).

Friday, February 17, 2006

Frivolous Lawsuit on the Historicity of Jesus

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 17, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Here's one that belongs in the category, "I don't know whether to laugh or to cry."

When people see the words "Catholic priest" and "stand trial" used together, they will probably assume that the priest is either being prosecuted or sued for some sort of alleged sexual abuse. A recent court proceeding in Italy, however, provides an amusing, if not irritating, exception to that trend. CNN recently reported that Luigi Cascioli, an Italian atheist, had petitioned the local court to force a Catholic priest to stand trial because--brace yourself--the priest had the audacity to assert that Jesus existed as a historical person. Cascioli claimed that the priest's assertion of the historicity of Jesus violated two laws: (1) a prohibition against "fraudulently deceiving people;" and (2) a law against "impersonation" or "personal gain from attributing a false name to someone."

The judge rightfully dismissed the ridiculous case. What I find baffling, however, is the idea that Cascioli actually believed that the Catholic priest had violated the law -- merely by asserting that Jesus existed. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Jesus didn't exist as a historical person. Even if it were the case that Jesus never existed, it wouldn't follow that Catholic priests who assert the historicity of Jesus are doing so fraudulently. In other words, it could be the case that the priest was honestly mistaken and not deliberately spreading information he knew to be false. In order to prove the priest had violated the law, however, Cascioli must not only prove that Jesus didn't exist, but that the Catholic priest knew that Jesus didn't exist. And that (the idea that the priest knew that Jesus didn't exist) strikes me as not only false, but absurd.

Cascioli's stupid lawsuit is an embarrassment to atheists worldwide. It is not representative of atheistic thought. 

Reppert on Drange vs. Wilson

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 17, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Victor Reppert here provides an assessment of the Drange-Wilson debate on the existence of the Christian God.

Thursday, February 16, 2006

Are Atheists "Afraid" of God?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 16, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Imagine a man, Tom, who likes sweets but not ice cream. He has no personal disagreements with anyone who does eat ice cream; he just chooses not to eat ice cream himself. In fact, Tom is friends with several people who will eat ice cream, but no other dessert. Suddenly, out of nowhere, comes an editorial from a prominent TV personality and ice cream lover making all sorts of accusations about people like Tom who don't eat ice cream. According to the editorial, people like Tom dislike the taste of ice cream so much that they are afraid of ice cream and generally unhappy people.

If you were Tom, how would you react? If you are anything like me, you might have mixed emotions, including confusion, sadness, and even outrage. Has this guy ever actually met someone who doesn't like ice cream? Who does this guy think he is? How dare he claim that everyone who doesn't eat ice cream is unhappy! Is society so hostile to people who don't like ice cream that these sort of bigoted remarks are tolerated by a mainstream journalist?

On the website of KOMO TV 4 in Seattle, Washington, Ken Schram posted an analogous editorial about atheists. According to Schram, claimed that atheists have the following characteristics:

  • They fear God so much that even hearing the word "God" distresses them.
  • He has observed Atheists squeeze their eyes shut when they remove bills from their pocket out of fear that they might see the phrase "In God we Trust."
  • Some go out of their way when driving to avoid passing churches, synagogues, mosques and temples.
  • Some recoil at the sight of a cross, crucifix, menorah, Star of David, or the presence of Hare Krishna proselytizers.

As the Center for Religious Tolerance points out, however, this doesn't match the descriptions of atheism that they have witnessed:

Our Atheist staff member reports that they have never performed any of these behaviors. None of the rest of us in this office have either observed them engaging in these behaviors, nor have we seen any of our Atheist friends and acquaintances doing them. They seem to be figments of Ken Schram's imagination.

Figments of Ken Schram's imagination, indeed. But this begs the question: why would a mainstream journalist be perpetuating a stereotype against a minority, a stereotype that could be shown to be false by even minimal investigation? His comments must either be the result of ignorance or dishonesty. In either case, it is obvious that Ken Schram is bigoted against atheists.

We next turn to Schram's armchair psychoanalysis of the millions of atheists around the world. Despite the obvious fact that he doesn't have a clue about atheists, he then proceeds to inform his readers that atheists derive some sort of sadistic pleasure from making theists suffer. Schram writes:

And even though atheists are free to go about their disbelieving ways, that doesn't seem enough to make them happy.

No. What makes atheists happy is making those who believe in God cringe.

So atheists go to court a lot.

Imagine if a prominent journalist wrote, "What makes Jews happy is making non-Jews cringe." Not only would such statements be factually inaccurate, they would be held in moral contempt. Not just Jews, but all reasonable non-Jews, would find such a slur offensive. And while the fact that someone would make such a racial or religious slur would not be news, the fact that a prominent member of the media would make such a slur would be news. There would be protests and calls for the journalist's termination.

Unlike other minorities, however, atheists are probably the only remaining minority in which it is socially acceptable to openly express prejudice against. There are probably two reasons for this. First, there are undoubtedly many people like Schram who share Schram's views. That is not the entire explanation, however. Ironically, I believe that the atheistic community also shares some responsibility for this situation and that leads to my second reason. By "the atheistic community," I don't mean atheistic membership organizations or the individuals who join them. Rather, I mean the millions of atheists who are apathetic about their atheism and in the closet to their families, co-workers, and neighbors. If we as a community aren't willing to defend ourselves, how can we expect anyone else to do so?

Saturday, February 04, 2006

Link: What it's Like to be an Atheist

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Richard Carrier brought the following to my attention:

http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/11/15/12016/649

Could an Atheist Pass a Lie Detector Test while Proclaiming Atheism?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

(Redating this post.)

While I am discussing the theme of defining one's opponents out of existence, here's an interesting twist on the idea. I received an email from a Christian with a link to an article that suggests most atheists could not pass a lie detector test if asked during the test if they believe in God and answered "No." The following is an excerpt.

"Indeed, to suppress the truth that God has placed within each man only leads to varying degrees of neurosis. As the noted psychologist Rollo May wrote in The Art of Counseling, "I have been startled by the fact that practically every genuine atheist with whom I have dealt has exhibited unmistakable neurotic tendencies. How [do we] account for this curious fact?"16 And, perhaps even more suggestive, according to Senior Pastor Jess Moody of the First Baptist Church of Van Nuys, California, "Lie detector tests were administered to more than 25,000 people. One of the questions was, 'Do you believe in God?' In every case, when a person answered no, the lie detector said he was lying." 17
---

Notes

16. Rollo May, The Art of Counseling, (NY Abingdon 1967), p. 215.

17. Cited in Los Angeles Times, June 28, 1986. We could not confirm this research. Convinced philosophical atheists clearly could pass lie detector tests since these measure conviction of belief. But such results, if valid, clearly show that the more garden-variety practical, as opposed to philosophical, atheists really aren't so sure of their views.

Ultimately, the question, "Can atheists proclaim their atheism during a lie detector test and pass the test?", is an empirical question, and even the author of the above article admits he was unable to confirm the "research" supporting the idea that atheists could not pass the test. I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if this turned out to be an urban legend.

Wednesday, February 01, 2006

The Possibility of Proving the Non-Existence of Something

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 1, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

In a recent blog entry, theistic philosopher William Vallicella criticizes a statement made by psychologist Paul Vitz, in which Vitz asserted that it is "intrinsically impossible" to "prove the non-existence of anything." As Vallicelli correctly points out:

"But surely there are things whose nonexistence can be proven. The nonexistence of a round square can be proven a priori by simply noting that something that is both round and nonround cannot exist."

What Vallicelli writes is consistent with my own essay on the subject, where I made the following observation.

Indeed, there are actually two ways to prove the nonexistence of something. One way is to prove that it cannot exist because it leads to contradictions (e.g., square circles, married bachelors, etc.). ...

The other way to prove the nonexistence of something is, in the words of Keith Parsons, "by carefully looking and seeing."

I could not agree with Vallicelli more when he concludes that Vitz's assertion is "plainly false."

Tuesday, January 31, 2006

Militant Agnosticism

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on January 31, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

I recently received an email from an agnostic named Dan who was, ironically enough, quite militant about his agnosticism! According to Dan, "one cannot logically be an atheist" because "a negative can never be proven." Notice, however, the statement "a negative can never be proven" is itself a negative statement. Either the statement "a negative can never be proven" can itself be proven, in which case the argument is self-refuting, or it can't be proven, in which case it doesn't provide a reason to reject atheism. I make this and other points in my essay, "Is a Sound Argument for the Non-Existence of a God Even Possible?"

When I referred Dan to the article, I explained that there are actually two ways to prove the nonexistence of something. One way is to prove that it cannot exist because its very concept is self-contradictory (e.g., square circles, married bachelors, etc.). The other way is by carefully looking and seeing. Both of these methods can and have been used to disprove various conceptions of God.

Dan took issue with the second method because it "presumes your senses and abilities are w/o bound." Not really; the fact that we are finite beings does not prevent us from legitimately concluding that, given some body of evidence, a particular hypothesis is more probable than another hypothesis. This goes for conclusions about God's existence just as it does for other areas where inductive logic is used, such as weather forecasting and criminal forensic investigations.

I suspect that Dan is holding both theism and atheism to a much higher evidential standard than we apply to other empirical questions. The fact that we might discover some new item of evidence in the future that supports a contradictory conclusion in no way undermines the fact that the evidence we have today supports an explanatory hypothesis. For example, the probability that the Declaration of Independence was signed on July 4, 1776 is extremely high, but it is not 100%. I suppose it is logically possible that in the future someone might discover historical evidence demonstrating the Declaration of Independence was signed on February 2, 1775. But the fact that such a thing is logically possible is irrelevant to the inductive (probabilistic) conclusion that the Declaration was indeed signed on July 4, 1776. In other words, a conclusion can be highly probable even if it is possible that the conclusion is false.

As a nontheist, I don't demand that someone prove to me that the existence of God is absolutely certain (i.e., has a 100% probability). I would settle for an argument showing that the total relevant evidence merely makes the existence of God highly probable. Similarly, we don't need absolutely certainty (i.e., 100% probability) in order to know that there is no God. We can use inductive arguments to show that God's nonexistence is more likely, even much more likely, than God's existence. And, indeed, I think there are inductively correct arguments that show religiously significant conceptions of God--such as the God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--do not exist.

After corresponding with presuppositionalists who make the ridiculous claim that there are no atheists, I thought I had heard everything. I was wrong. After reading my defense of the second method of proving the nonexistence of something, Dan then proceeded to tell me that I am "really" an agnostic but I just refuse to admit it. This remarkable conclusion is supposed to follow from the fact that I don't claim to be able to prove with absolute certainty that God doesn't exist. The fact of the matter, however, is that ordinary usage of the word "atheist" does not support that conclusion. There is no requirement that one has to be absolutely certain that there is no God in order to qualify as an atheist. I have never claimed to be absolutely certain that atheism is true, but it doesn't follow that I merely lack belief in God or that I am not an atheist. Rather, I believe God's existence is very improbable.

To make an analogy, I don't know with absolute certainty that the sun will rise tomorrow, but I am highly confident that it will (i.e., it has an epistemic probability for me of >99.999%). That hardly means I am "agnostic" about whether the sun will rise. (In other words, one can hold a belief without assigning an epistemic probability of 100%.)

I'm reminded of Taner Edis's recent discussion about individuals who claim that everyone is born 'my' way (i.e., theists who claim that everyone is born theist, atheists who claim that everyone is born atheist). Granted, Dan's claim (that I and at least some other atheists are really agnostics) is not quite in the same category as the claims that Taner was discussing. But it is interesting to me that so many people's argumentative strategy includes defining one's 'opposition' out of existence!

Monday, January 23, 2006

Link: Is Michael Martin's Position in ATHEISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION inconsistent?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on January 23, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Saturday, January 21, 2006

Denying Big God and the Little God: The Next Step for Atheists?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on January 21, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Tom Clark at the Center for Naturalism has written an open letter to the atheist community entitled, "Denying Big God and the Little God: The Next Step for Atheists?"

Do Writers Have an Obligation to Present Both Sides of an Issue?

I wrote a review of Lee Strobel's Case for Christ that was published in 1999 in the peer-reviewed journal, Philo, the official journal of the Society of Humanist Philosophers. In that review, I concluded:


Strobel did not interview any critics of Evangelical apologetics. He sometimes refutes at great length objections not made by the critics (e.g., the claim that Jesus was mentally insane); more often, he doesn't address objections the critics do make (e.g., the unreliability of human memory, that non-Christian historians do not provide any independent confirmation for the deity of Jesus, etc.) Perhaps this will be a welcome feature to people who already believe Christianity but have no idea why they believe it. For those of us who are primarily interested in the truth, however, we want to hear both sides of the story.

Thursday, January 12, 2006

Link: "An Atheist Manifesto" by Sam Harris

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on January 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

A friend just pointed me to a site entitled, "An Atheist Manifesto."

New Blog: The Secular Outpost

I am a contributor to a new blog representing the Internet Infidels' Secular Web. The new blog is called "the Secular Outpost."

LINK

Friday, January 06, 2006

EMPTY TOMB: JESUS BEYOND THE GRAVE

Robert M. Price and I co-edited an anthology on the alleged resurrection of Jesus, entitled The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. The book is a reader of 15 essays on the alleged historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, with a topical bibliography totaling 25 pages. Contributors include Richard Carrier, Robert Greg Cavin, J. Duncan M. Derrett, Theodore Drange, Evan Fales, Peter Kirby, Michael Martin, Keith Parsons, and Robert M. Price.

Is Atheism a Worldview?

In the comments on a posting to another blog, one reader argued that atheism is a worldview because it "answers the big questions in life."

Thursday, January 05, 2006

Ramblings on the State of Modern Atheism

I discovered this link on the blog of a Christian philosopher, who introduced it as "terrific post on the current state of atheism."

Wednesday, January 04, 2006

Disagreement Among Self-Described Atheists about the Meaning of "Atheism"

The "atheist" movement keeps shooting itself in the foot by failing to reach a consensus regarding the meaning of "atheism." Allow me to explain.

Tuesday, January 03, 2006

Sunday, January 01, 2006

Getting Atheists to Take Atheism Seriously

In a recent post to his own blog, philosopher William Vallicella states, "It is exceedingly difficult to get atheists to take theism seriously." I agree, but I would take the point a step further and argue that it is exceedingly difficult to get atheists to take their own atheism seriously. An interesting case in point is atheist philosopher Julian Baggini, author of the excellent book, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press). Despite the fact that he has written a book on atheism, he wrote the following statement in a review of Michael Martin's and Ricki Monnier's book, The Impossibility of God:

Link: Daniel Howard-Snyder on the Trilemma Argument

http://www.cc.wwu.edu/~howardd/mbgfp5web.pdf